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ABSTRACT
This article explores the landmark decision Carpenter v. United States, which
represents a significant shift in how courts should evaluate the privacy implications of
new disruptive technologies, like cell-site location information, and what they can offer
to law enforcement. The Supreme Court evaluated the nature of the information
collected in the context of a search, which is a stark departure from its conventional
Fourth Amendment analysis that generally focuses on the manner or location in which
a search transpires. This article parallels the Court’s reasoning to facial recognition
technologies and argues that Carpenter is a major inflection point in the Court’s
privacy jurisprudence concerning new pervasive technologies in our data-drive society.
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CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES: STEP FORWARD FOR SMARTPHONES AND
THEIR DATA, BUT MAYBE NOT FOR OTHER TECHNOLOGIES
STEPHEN BARTHOLOMEW*

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is a nation of 326 million people, yet there are 396 million
registered cell phone service accounts.1 Additionally, the world creates over 2.5
quintillion bytes of data each day, and over 90% of the world’s data is less than two
years old.2 Unsurprisingly, most of this new data consists of Cell-Site Location
Information (CSLI). CSLI is created whenever a phone connects to a nearby cellular
tower.3 Whenever a user sends a text, makes a call, or receives a news update, a timestamped record is created.4
Historically, the Supreme Court has held that one does not have a property
interest in data or information conveyed to another party under the third-party
doctrine.5 The Supreme Court applied this principle to data and records created or held
by a third-party on the grounds of voluntary disclosure.6 The Court in Smith v.
Maryland and United States v. Miller reasoned that one “assumes the risk” of any
potential disclosure to a third-party.7 But as Justice Gorsuch in his dissenting opinion
in Carpenter so eloquently asserted, “no one believes that, if they ever did.”8
The case of Carpenter represents a stark departure from the bright-line rule that
one’s Fourth Amendment privacy interest in information is extinguished when it is
disclosed to another.9 This case finally reconciles issues regarding data that is not truly
*
© Stephen Bartholomew 2021. Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2022, at UIC John Marshall Law
School, BA in Economics & Political Science, Certificate in Informatics, Indiana University
Bloomington (2019). Thank you to the RIPL editing staff for all your help and input to assist me in
finishing this article. And to Professor Robinson for exposing me to the field of data privacy; your
valuable instruction and passion certainly impacted me in authoring this article.
1 Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2019).
2 Bernard Marr, How Much Data Do We Create Every Day?: The Mind-Blowing Stats Everyone
Should Read, FORBES (May 21, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/21/howmuch-data-do-we-create-every-day-the-mind-blowing-stats-everyone-should-read/.
3 Eric Lode, Validity of Use of Cellular Telephone or Tower to Track Prospective, Real Time, or
Historical Position of Possessor of Phone Under Fourth Amendment, 92 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1, 2 (2015).
4 Cellphone Location Tracking: A Guide for Criminal Defense Attorneys, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/files/2017/10/30/cell_phone_location_information_one_pager_0.pdf (last
visited Sept. 27, 2020).
5 U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
6 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (“When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical
information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordinary
course of business.”).
7 Id. (“In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the
numbers he dialed.”).
8 Carpenter, 138 U.S. at 2262.
9 Id. at 2219.
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“given,” but automatically created.10 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
held that historical CSLI is protected by the Fourth Amendment because of the “deeply
revealing” nature of the data and the pervasiveness of smartphones in modern
society.11
The Court in Carpenter arrived at the correct outcome but made the analysis more
discretionary.12 However, its decision may signal that the Court is willing to take a
more flexible approach in its privacy jurisprudence concerning other disruptive
technologies. Though the Court finally reconciled technology’s pervasiveness in its
evaluation, this will likely come at the expense of uniformity in its future application.
Part II will discuss CSLI, its functions, and the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence prior to the decision in Carpenter. Part III will discuss the
case itself and the perspectives that each opinion asserts with respect to CSLI. Part IV
will evaluate the decision’s shortcomings, future implications, its application amongst
the lower courts, and its potential application to comprehensive facial recognition
technologies. And finally, Part V will conclude that while Carpenter is a landmark
decision for privacy rights, its future applicability for courts remains unclear. That
being said, its flexibility is necessary to include more disruptive technologies in the
future.
II. BACKGROUND & EXISTING LAW

A. Overview of Cell-Site Location Information
Each cell tower has multiple antennas pointing in each direction, covering a
circular geographic area.13 A CSLI record is created when a phone receives a call,

10 Id. at 2220 (“Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls,
texts, or e-mails and countless other connection that a phone automatically makes when checking for
news, weather, or social media updates . . . in no meaningful senses does the user voluntarily ‘assume
the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.”).
11 Id. at 2221 (“Given the unique nature of cell phone location information, the fact that the
Government obtained the information from a third party does not overcome Carpenter's claim to
Fourth Amendment protection. The Government's acquisition of the cell-site records was a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
12 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2266. Gorsuch argues that Roberts’ analysis adds two subjective prongs
to determine whether there is a need to avoid “arbitrary power” and “too permeating of a police
surveillance” without offering any guidance for lower courts on how to do that. This leaves judges
room to operate at their own discretion. He additionally notes that the line drawn at seven days is
arbitrary itself and not logically tied to any former precedent or principle.
13 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2225:

The cell-site and antenna data points, together with the date and time of
connection, are known as cell-site location information, or cell-site records. By
linking an individual's cell phone to a particular 120– or 60–degree sector of a cell
site's coverage area at a particular time, cell-site records reveal the general location
of the cell phone user. The location information revealed by cell-site records is
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email, text, news update, or anything which causes it to function.14 This occurs each
time a user’s phone connects to a nearby cell-tower.15 With the assistance of other
nearby towers, any smartphone owner’s location can be triangulated and tracked using
CSLI.16 As you travel, your phone connects to the nearest cell-site to provide you with
the strongest signal—creating a CSLI record.17 This generates a comprehensive
register of any smartphone user’s precise movements for as long as the wireless carrier
deems necessary.
The accuracy of the CSLI-data is contingent upon the concentration of cell-sites
in an area.18 The more sites, the greater the tracking precision.19 Last year, the
Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association recorded an 82.2% increase in
the amount of data traffic in the United States.20 The increase in the number of cellsites mirrors the amount of CSLI generated. Also, because carriers sell aggregated
location records to data brokers, your location is now one of your wireless carrier’s most
profitable commodities.21
In the digital age, smartphones have transformed from a privilege enjoyed by the
affluent few to a necessity to accomplish mundane daily tasks. When the Court
originally fashioned its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it could not have fathomed
the technologies at the common man's disposal today. The rapid pace of innovation is
a reason why the Court must adopt a flexible privacy framework. The conditions that
Justice Brandeis feared in Olmstead v. United States are now a reality and judges
should seek to protect citizens’ liberties from the encroachments of technological
innovation.22

imprecise, because an individual cell-site sector usually covers a large geographic
area.
Cellphone Location Tracking, supra note 4.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2225.
16 Cellphone Location Tracking, supra note 4.
17 Id.
18 Christian Bennardo, The Fourth Amendment, CSLI Tracking, and the Mosaic Theory, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 2385, 2391 (2017).
19 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211 (“The precision of this information depends on the size of the
geographic area covered by the cell site . . . . As data usage from cell phones has increased, wireless
carriers have installed more cell sites to handle the traffic. That has led to increasingly compact
coverage areas, especially in urban areas.”).
20 2019 Annual Survey Highlights, CTIA (June 20, 2019), https://www.ctia.org/news/2019-annualsurvey-highlights.
21 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (Wireless carriers “collect and store CSLI for their own business
purposes, including finding weak spots in their network and applying ‘roaming’ charges when another
carrier routes data through their cell sites . . . carriers often sell aggregated location records to data
brokers, without individual identifying information of the sort at issue here.”).
22 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting):
14
15

Moreover, ‘in the application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of
what has been, but of what may be.’ . . . Ways may someday be developed by which
the government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them
in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home.
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B. Property Based Approach Centered on Trespass
Initially, the Court based its privacy jurisprudence on the express language of the
Fourth Amendment, which outlines protections for one’s “person, house, papers, and
effects” from unreasonable searches and seizures.23 The case of Olmstead v. United
States created the trespass-based approach to one’s right to privacy.24 There, law
enforcement installed wiretaps, which did not physically encroach upon the
defendant's property, in order to collect information to arrest Olmstead.25 The Court
held that employing a wiretap was not a “search” within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.26 Chief Justice Taft asserted that a search under the Fourth Amendment
must relate to one’s physical person, a seizure of his papers, or tangible material
effects.27 Material seizure and physical intrusion were paramount for a search to occur
under the Fourth Amendment.28
Nineteen years later, however, in Silverman v. United States, the Court defined
its approach further in a case where agents used a “spike mike” to listen to the
suspect’s private conversation.29 The evidence leading to Silverman’s arrest was
collected using the device, which was placed several inches into an adjoining wall.30
The physical intrusion of the microphone into the heating duct of the defendant's
property was enough for the Court to determine that a search occurred under the
Fourth Amendment.31

23

U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

24 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456. There, the defendant was convicted of violating the National
Prohibition Act through a conspiracy to sell liquor illegally.
25 Id. at 457 (“Small wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires from the residences
of four of the petitioners and those leading from the chief office . . . . They were made in the basement
of the large office building. The taps from house lines were made in the streets near the houses.”).
26 Id. at 466.
27 Id.
28 Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942). Similarly, in Goldman, the Court expanded on its
trespass-centric jurisprudence. Goldman was convicted by using a detectaphone on an adjoining wall,
next to the office where he was talking on the phone. The majority emphasized the absence of a
physical trespass in its holding, refusing to overrule Olmstead because there was no “reasonable or
logical distinction.”
29 Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961) (“The petitioners were tried and found
guilty . . . upon three counts of an indictment charging gambling offenses . . . police officers were
permitted to describe incriminating conversations . . . at their alleged gambling establishment,
conversations which the officers had overheard by means of an electronic listening device.”).
30 Id. at 507.
31 Id. at 511 (“officers overheard the petitioners' conversations only by usurping part of the
petitioners' house or office—a heating system which was an integral part of the premises occupied by
the petitioners . . . In these circumstances we need not pause to consider whether or not there was a
technical trespass.”).
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C. Katz and One’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In the Sixties, the Court added another element to its privacy analysis based on
one’s reasonable expectations of privacy in the case of Katz v. United States.32 There,
agents attached a recording device to the top of a public phone booth from which Katz
would make his calls.33 The phone-tap recordings were used to support the state’s
indictment.34
The Court ruled that placing the recording device was impermissible, but the
majority failed to fashion any concrete rule.35 The majority asserted that the Fourth
Amendment “protects people and not places,” and held that the Amendment’s language
applied to the recording of oral statements regardless of any trespass.36 The opinion
emphasized that the State operated without a warrant in the case, which is why it
ruled in Katz' favor.37
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz, however, offered a distinct perspective for
courts to evaluate privacy rights. First, Justice Harlan considered whether a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in an article of information, and then he
considered whether society accepts it as “reasonable.”38 This framework is used in
addition to the Court’s trespass framework and is more discretionary in exchange for
its additional flexibility.39
D. Smith and Miller: The Inception of the Third-Party Doctrine
More than fifty years later, in the cases of Smith and Miller, the Court fashioned
the third-party doctrine. The doctrine rests on the assumption that one has a “reduced
expectation of privacy in information that is voluntarily shared with others.”40 In the
case of Miller,41 the Court held that Miller had no expectation of privacy in bank
records because they cannot be considered Miller’s “private papers,” but rather
business records that Miller voluntarily disclosed to the bank.42 The Court reasoned
32 Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967) (“The petitioner was convicted in the District Court for
the Southern District of California under an eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting
wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston in violation of a federal
statute.”).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 352 (“But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding
eye—it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls from
a place where he might be seen.”).
36 Id.
37 Katz, 389 U.S. at 356.
38 Id. at 360–61.
39 U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012). Justice Scalia asserts that the Court’s trespass
framework can be used for some cases, while Katz’ reasonable expectation framework may be more
proper for others.
40 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
41 U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976) (“Respondent was convicted of possessing an
unregistered still, carrying on the business of a distiller without giving bond and with intent to
defraud the Government of whiskey tax, possessing 175 gallons of whiskey upon which no taxes had
been paid, and conspiring to defraud the United States of tax revenues.”).
42 Id. at 441.
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that one takes a risk in disclosing information to another that the information will be
conveyed to someone else, like the State.43 Justice Powell additionally stated that it is
immaterial if the information was only revealed for a “limited purpose.”44
Likewise, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court employed the third-party
doctrine for another technology—a pen register.45 There, the Court rejected the notion
that using a pen register amounted to a search.46 The Court believed that Smith did
not have an expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed because he disclosed the
information to the automatic connection service.47 The Court reasoned that phone
users “assumed the risk” of possible disclosure to the police.48 Even if one has an
expectation of privacy in these phone records, the expectation would not be legitimate
because of the risk of such future disclosure.49
E. The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703
In response to technological innovation, Congress enacted the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986.50 Article II of this legislation is the Stored
Communications Act (SCA), which prohibits unauthorized compulsion or disclosure of
stored communications like email and phone records.51 Specifically, § 2703 prescribes
procedures the State must comply with in order to compel the disclosure of consumer
data.52
Access to stored records under the SCA is granted when a warrant is secured, or
a court order is granted pursuant to subsection d.53 Section 2703(d) requires a judge to
issue an order if the State offers “specific and articulable facts, showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe the contents . . . are relevant and material.”54 This
43 Id. at 443 (“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information
will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”).
44 Id.
45 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). After a robbery, McDonough began receiving
strange calls from someone identifying themselves as the robber. The police requested the telephone
company to place a pen register on the petitioner’s house to record any incoming calls.
46 Id. at 742.
47 Id. (“All telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone
company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed.
All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities for making permanent records
of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills.”).
48 Id. at 744.
49 Smith, 442 U.S. at 746.
50 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2703 (2021).
51 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2021).
52 Id. Subsection (a) of the provision pertains to the contents of communications in electronic
storage, (b) relates to remote computing services, and (c) pertains to the records of both categories.
53 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a)–2703(c) (2021). The requirements for disclosure prescribe a valid warrant
be issued, unless a court order is granted under subsection (d).
54 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2021):

A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court
that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental
entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
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standard is lower than that prescribed by the Fourth Amendment. It is also frequently
used by police to avoid having to collect more evidence to meet the Amendment's
threshold of probable cause to obtain a warrant.55
F. The Court’s Privacy Jurisprudence in Relation to Modern Technologies

1. Modern Police Technologies, G.P.S., and Smartphones
Like Congress, the Court also accounted for new disruptive technologies in its
privacy jurisprudence. In the case of Kyllo v. United States, the Court evaluated the
use of a thermal-imaging device.56 Here, the Court appeared to fashion its rule to
account more for new pervasive technologies, holding that the use of the device
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.57 Justice Scalia asserted that
when law enforcement uses technology that is unavailable to the public to collect
information, and which would otherwise be impossible without physical intrusion, it is
“presumptively unreasonable absent a warrant.”58
However, in the case of Jones v. United States, the Court reintroduced its
traditional trespass approach when the State attached a G.P.S. device onto the
defendant’s car.59 Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion, held that the State's
installation of the G.P.S. device constituted a search within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.60 In his analysis, Justice Scalia focused on the State’s physical trespass
when it installed the device on the undercarriage of the defendant’s vehicle.61 He

grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the
records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.
55
56

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 29–30, (2001):
In 1991 Agent William Elliott of the United States Department of the Interior came
to suspect that marijuana was being grown in the home belonging to petitioner
Danny Kyllo, part of a triplex on Rhododendron Drive in Florence, Oregon. Indoor
marijuana growth typically requires high-intensity lamps. In order to determine
whether an amount of heat was emanating from petitioner's home consistent with
the use of such lamps, at 3:20 a.m. on January 16, 1992, Agent Elliott and Dan
Haas used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to scan the triplex.

Id. at 40.
Id. (“when the state uses a device, not in general public use to explore the details of the home
that would be impossible without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a search and presumptively
unreasonable absent a warrant.”).
59 U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012).
60 Id. at 405–06 (“It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The Government
physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that
such a physical intrusion would have been considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when it was adopted.”).
61 Id.
57
58

[20:308 2021]

Carpenter v. United States: Step Forward for Smartphones
and Their Data, But Maybe Not for Other Technologies

315

further noted that the Katz reasonable expectation framework simply supplements the
common law trespass approach; it does not replace it.62
While joining in the opinion, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence argued that because
of the nature of the information, “long term G.P.S. surveillance impinges on one's
expectations of privacy.”63 Such a comprehensive record provides not just one’s
location, but details concerning one’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.”64 Thus, supporting the notion that one possesses an expectation
of privacy in whole of their physical movements.65
Riley v. United States was the first case to distinguish a smartphone from other
traditional technologies.66 Here, the Court held that an officer could not search a
smartphone incident to arrest because the smartphone is fundamentally different from
other articles on one's person.67 Chief Justice Roberts noted that an individual’s “entire
private life can be reconstructed through a thousand pictures that have locations and
descriptions.”68 The pervasiveness of a smartphone simply cannot be compared to that
of physical records; and smartphone records are qualitatively different from any
tangible record.69
2. Facial Recognition Technologies
Facial Recognition Technologies (FRT) present many of the same concerns as
historical CSLI but with a sinister caveat. Just as Justice Sotomayor in Jones warned,
FRT offers substantially more information than one’s location; it offers the ultimate

Id. at 409.
Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
64 Jones, 565 U.S. at 415.
65 Id. at 417. To end, she posited that the notion of the third-party doctrine should be reconsidered
on the ground that disclosure of information to third parties is a necessity merely to carry on with
their lives.
66 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 379 (2014)
62
63

An officer searched Riley incident to the arrest and found items associated with the
“Bloods” street gang. He also seized a cell phone from Riley's pants pocket.
According to Riley's uncontradicted assertion, the phone was a “smart phone,” a cell
phone with a broad range of other functions based on advanced computing
capability, large storage capacity, and Internet connectivity.
67

Id. at 383
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use
in order to resist arrest or effect his escape . . . . In addition, it is entirely reasonable
for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person
in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.

Id. at 394.
Id. at 393 (“The term “cell phone” is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in
fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could just
as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries,
albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”).
68
69
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“privac[y] of life,” your face.70 Currently, China leads the world in the number of CCTV
cameras it employs at 200 million, with the United States behind it at 50 million
cameras.71 However, the United States contains more CCTV cameras per capita than
China, with both Chicago and New York boasting 35,000 and 11,000 cameras,
respectively.72
Law enforcement may obtain anyone’s photo through a number of government
databases containing mugshots, civil service photos, and drivers’ license photos.73
Faces are also obtained through CCTV cameras, police body cameras, as well as
privately owned security systems registered with the police for “centralized police
monitoring.”74 According to a Georgetown study, half of all Americans have images
stored in law enforcement facial recognition databases.75 Generally, FRT first captures
your face from a photo or video, then reads your face’s geometry, which is then
compared to a database of known faces.76 It can be done retrospectively or
contemporaneously as China has regarding protesters and its Uighur population.77
China’s FRT system can locate a BBC reporter testing its capabilities amongst a
city of 4.3 million citizens in a blistering seven minutes.78 While the United States does
not possess such capabilities yet, police departments across the country are adopting
FRT from private companies like Clearview AI.79 Clearview AI is currently used by
around 2,400 law enforcement agencies around the country and offers police a
repository of photos scraped from all across the web.80 If this omnipotent tool can be
created by a mere startup company, it can be perfected by a government absent proper
limitations.

Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Justinas Baltrusaitis, Top 10 Countries and Cities by Number of CCTV Cameras, PRECISE
SECURITY (Dec. 12, 2020), https://www.precisesecurity.com/articles/Top-10-Countries-by-Number-ofCCTV-Cameras.
72 Id.
73 Jake Laperruque, Facing the Future of Surveillance, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (Dec. 12,
2020), https://www.pogo.org/report/2019/03/facing-the-future-of-surveillance/.
74 Id.
75 Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathon Frankle, The Perpetual Lineup: Unregulated Police
Face Recognition in America, GEORGETOWN CENTER ON PRIV. AND TECH. (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://www.perpetuallineup.org.
76 Steve
Symanovich,
How
Does
Facial
Recognition
Work?,
NORTON,
https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-iot-how-facial-recognition-software-works.html (last visited
Sept. 27, 2020).
77 Abdullah Hasan, 2019 Proved We Can Stop Face Recognition Surveillance, ACLU (Jan. 17,
2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/2019-was-the-year-we-proved-face-recognitionsurveillance-isnt-inevitable/.
78 Jon Russell, China’s CCTV surveillance network took just 7 minutes to capture BBC reporter,
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 12, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/13/china-cctv-bbc-reporter/.
79 Connie Fossi & Phil Prazen, Miami Police Used Facial Recognition Technology in Protester’s
Arrest, NBC 6 SOUTH FLORIDA (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.nbcmiami.com/investigations/miamipolice-used-facial-recognition-technology-in-protesters-arrest/.
80 Heather Somerville, Facial-Recognition Startup Clearview Moves to Limit Risk of Police Abuse,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facial-recognition-startup-clearview-movesto-prevent-possible-police-abuse-11603217327.
70
71
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III. CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES (2018)

A. Facts of Carpenter
The case of Carpenter stemmed from a string of Radio Shack and T-Mobile store
robberies that occurred in Michigan and Ohio.81 Based on a confession, the FBI
requested two court orders under § 2703(d) of the S.C.A. to obtain the CSLI of Timothy
Carpenter from his wireless carriers.82 Both orders were granted, which disclosed
almost 13,000 location points to the FBI—an average of 101 points per day.83 This
information ultimately implicated Carpenter's involvement as it showed his phone
“roaming” in Ohio at the time the robberies occurred.84
B. Procedural Posture
At trial, Carpenter moved to suppress the evidence arguing that the seizure of
cell-site information violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
seizures absent a warrant supported by probable cause.85 Ultimately, the District
Court denied his motion to suppress.86 The District Court found in favor of the State
and convicted Carpenter.87 Carpenter appealed to the Sixth Circuit and it upheld his
conviction using the third-party doctrine.88 This CSLI data, in the Sixth Circuit’s view,
was “voluntarily conveyed” by phone users for connection and was not within the
purview of the Fourth Amendment.89
C. Chief Justice Roberts’ Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts began his opinion by emphasizing that the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment “is to safeguard privacy and security of individuals against
81 Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018). Officers arrested four men connected with the
robberies and obtained, through a confession, the phone numbers of his co-conspirators.
82 Id. (“The first order sought 152 days of cell-site records from MetroPCS, which produced records
spanning 127 days. The second order requested seven days of CSLI from Sprint, which produced two
days of records covering the period when Carpenter's phone was “roaming” in northeastern Ohio.”).
83 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2122.
84 Id. The United States subsequently filed suit alleging Carpenter's involvement, charging him
with six counts of robbery and six counts of carrying a firearm during a federal crime of violence.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 2213. This conclusion rested on seven accomplices denoting Carpenter as the operation’s
leader and an FBI agent’s expert testimony interpreting the CSLI to show Carpenter at the scene of
four robberies.
87 Id. Carpenter was convicted on all six counts of robbery and all but one of the six firearm counts.
He was sentenced to more than 100 years in prison.
88 U.S. v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Given that cell phone users voluntarily
convey cell-site data to their carriers as “a means of establishing communication,” the court concluded
that the resulting business records are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”).
89 Id.
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arbitrary invasions.”90 He then summarized the Court’s privacy jurisprudence and
noted how there is no single test under the Fourth Amendment.91 In Roberts’ opinion,
the Amendment “seeks to secure the ‘privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power’. . . and
‘to place obstacles in the way of too permeating police surveillance’”92
Roberts ended his summary of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by
discussing the Court's modern cases, which began to emphasize the technology's
pervasiveness.93 With that, he turned to the present dispute and concluded that
requests for historical CSLI intersect two precedential lines.94 The first addresses one’s
“expectations of privacy in their physical location and movements.”95 The second
concerns the third-party doctrine and one’s expectation of privacy regarding
information voluntarily divulged to others.96
Beginning with the first line of cases, Roberts mentioned that “a person does not
surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.”97
Additionally, he noted a majority of the Court already recognizes a privacy expectation
in the “aggregate of one’s physical movements.”98 While this reasoning directly
pertained to G.P.S. technology, he contended that cell-site records are even more
intrusive, thus warranting protection.99
CSLI, according to Roberts, achieves near perfect surveillance, “as if there were
an ankle monitor on a user’s phone.”100 It grants the government a comprehensive
record of anyone’s historical location and therefore should be subject to an expectation
of privacy.101 Using this reasoning, Roberts rejected the State’s argument that the
90 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213. The founders crafted this provision as a response to the General
Warrants and Writs of Assistance, permitting British officers to go through homes unrestrained
searching for evidence of criminal activities. See Camara v. Municipal Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S.
523, 528 (1967).
91 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14.
92 Id. at 2214; U.S. v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948); Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
93 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214.

As technology has enhanced the Government's capacity to encroach . . . this Court
has sought to “assure preservation of that degree of privacy against government
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
“Likewise in Riley, the Court recognized the “immense storage capacity” of modern
cell phones in holding that police officers must generally obtain a warrant before
searching the contents of a phone.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 380.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215.
Id.; U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
96 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216; Miller, 425 U.S. at 444; Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
97 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
98 Id. (“A majority of this Court has already recognized that individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements.”).
99 Id. (“Mapping a cell phone's location over the course of 127 days provides an all-encompassing
record of the holder's whereabouts. As with GPS information, the time-stamped data provides an
intimate window into a person's life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them
his “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations”) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at
415).
100 Id. at 2218.
101 Id.
94
95
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third-party doctrine should apply because CSLI is a “business record.”102 Given the
nature and pervasiveness of CSLI, the doctrine cannot apply because this information
is not voluntarily shared; it is created automatically anytime your phone functions.103
Roberts ultimately held that the government’s acquisition of CSLI constituted a
search, and because it was conducted absent a valid warrant, was impermissible.104
Moreover, § 2703(d) of the S.C.A. was an invalid avenue to obtain Carpenter’s
historical location data because a warrant supported by probable cause was
required.105 Simply offering facts to show why information was “relevant and material”
to the state’s investigation under § 2703(d), was insufficient.106 A more stringent
standard is required to uphold citizen privacy rights. Finally, Roberts stated that the
opinion is narrow and applies only in circumstances of historical CSLI collection, before
remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the majority’s opinion.107
D. Justice Kennedy’s Dissenting Opinion
Conversely, in his dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that a search did not occur
because CSLI is a typical business record.108 Kennedy stated that customers have no
expectation of privacy because they do not “own, possess, control, or use” the records.109
Unlike Roberts, Kennedy disputed the records’ accuracy because of the design of cellsite dishes, which cover such a vast geographical area.110
Justice Kennedy classified the third-party doctrine from Smith and Miller as a
categorical rule, and argued the majority misapplied the rule when it distinguished
CSLI from other business records.111 If it’s a business record, there is no expectation of

the Government can now travel back in time to retrace a person's whereabouts,
subject only to the retention polices of the wireless carriers, which currently
maintain records for up to five years. Critically, because location information is
continually logged for all of the 400 million devices in the United States—not just
those belonging to persons who might happen to come under investigation—this
newfound tracking capacity runs against everyone.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
Id. at 2220.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 2221 (“Under the standard in the Stored Communications Act, however, law
enforcement need only show that the cell-site evidence might be pertinent to an ongoing
investigation—a “gigantic” departure from the probable cause rule, as the Government explained
below.”).
106 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2021).
107 Id.
108 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2224.
109 Id. (“Cell-site records, however, are no different from the many other kinds of business records
the Government has a lawful right to obtain by compulsory process. Customers . . . have no reasonable
expectation that they cannot be disclosed pursuant to lawful compulsory process.”).
110 Id. at 2225 (“The typical cell site covers a more-or-less circular geographic area around the
site. It has three (or sometimes six) separate antennas pointing in different directions . . . . So a cell
phone activated on the north side of a cell site will connect to a different antenna than a cell phone on
the south side.”).
111 Id. at 2230, 2232. Additionally, he argues that the records at issue in Smith and Miller also
paint a comprehensive picture of one’s life.
102
103
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privacy in the information.112 Accordingly, the case should have been resolved by using
traditional property principles since the government searched nothing which
Carpenter owned.113
Justice Kennedy argued that requiring a warrant to obtain CSLI encroaches on
Congress' powers to denote a compulsory process as an alternative way to collect
information to aid investigations.114 Given that Carpenter did not possess a legitimate
expectation of privacy in anything the government searched, the search was
permissible because it was authorized according to § 2703(d) of the S.C.A.115
E. Justice Gorsuch’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Gorsuch began his dissent by discussing the pervasiveness of smart phone
technologies. He noted how many of people’s most private documents, which would
have been locked away, now reside on third-party servers.116 He then proceeded to
criticize the logic of the third-party doctrine, arguing no one ever believed it, “if they
ever did.”117 Justice Gorsuch chose to frame his opinion with three potential avenues
forward for the Court’s privacy jurisprudence.
The first is to ignore the problems with the third-party doctrine and “live with the
consequences.”118 The second avenue disregards the doctrine and returns to the Katz
framework, which he fears will return us to where we are now.119 The final option is to
re-couple the Court’s privacy framework with positive law.120 Gorsuch believed the
third avenue was best, through his criticism of the majority's approach, arguing it
effectively creates two balancing tests that will be problematic for lower courts to
apply.121
First, he framed the analysis through a Fourth Amendment lens but noted that
unless the Court is evaluating tangible items, the application of “papers and effects”
to a digital world fails.122 He next hypothesized whether the archaic concept of
bailments can provide an effective solution.123 Gorsuch seemed to support the parallel
of entrusting your data to another party to one's “modern papers and effects,” but
understood the approach's limitations. 124

Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234.
114 Id. Without the compulsory process under § 2703(d), he argues, police would have a daunting
job, and their efforts would be stymied for no reason. It also unnecessarily calls into question the
subpoena mechanisms the legislature decided to implement.
115 Id. at 2235.
116 Id. at 2262.
117 Id.
118 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 2267.
122 Id. at 2268.
123 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268 (“a bailment is a delivery of a thing in trust for some special
object or purpose, and upon a contract, expressed or implied, to conform to the object or purpose of the
trust. A bailee normally owes a legal duty to keep the item safe.”).
124 Id. at 2269.
112
113
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Justice Gorsuch also postulated that statutory law may provide guidance on how
a property interest can be identified in one’s data.125 To conclude, Gorsuch explicitly
recognized that customers have substantial legal interests in digital information,
which could even rise to a property right.126 However, he asserts that he dissented on
this matter because the majority’s framework was overly arbitrary.127
IV. ANALYSIS

A. Technological Exceptionalism to Create a New Flexible Approach
In many respects, Carpenter was a revolutionary decision. Not because of the test
it promulgates, but because of the general principles present in the case concerning
new technologies. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, emphasized the
nature of the information collected because it created an “all-encompassing record” of
Carpenter’s location.128 This is a significant departure from the Court’s prior Fourth
Amendment cases, which typically focused on the manner or location in which a search
transpires.129 Although Katz stated that the Fourth Amendment “protects people and
not places,” Carpenter is one of the first Supreme Court cases to employ this principle
in the context of a search.130
Much of Roberts’ reasoning appears to adopt an approach based on a theory of
technological exceptionalism through his refusal to analogize CSLI with any former
technology.131 Technology is exceptional “when its introduction . . . requires a
125 Id. at 2272 (“The statute generally forbids a carrier to ‘use, disclose, or permit access to
individually identifiable’ CPNI without the customer's consent, except as needed to provide the
customer's telecommunications services . . . It also requires the carrier to disclose CPNI ‘upon
affirmative written request by the customer, to any person designated by the customer.’”).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (“Although such records are generated for commercial purposes,
that distinction does not negate Carpenter's anticipation of privacy in his physical location. Mapping
a cell phone's location over the course of 127 days provides an all-encompassing record of the holder's
whereabouts.”).
129 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 457 (Taft focused on the absence of a trespass. What was material was
that the wires did not encroach on Olmstead’s property.); Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942)
(The majority emphasized the absence of a trespass. The substance of the defendants’ conversations
was not important.); Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961) (Court again focused on the location
and the manner in which the police used a spike mike to listen.); Katz, 389 U.S. at 348 (Majority
focused on the police operating without a warrant); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30 (The Court emphasized the
thermal imaging device used to look into Kyllo’s residence.); Jones, 565 U.S. at 403 (Scalia, writing
for the majority, focused on the police placing a GPS device on Jones’ car.).
130 Katz, 389 U.S. at 315. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 393. In the case of Riley, Chief Justice Roberts
did not focus on the location in which the suspect was searched, nor did he focus on the information
that stemmed from the search. There, what was material was the fact that a smartphone is entirely
distinct from any traditional article that would be searched incident to an arrest. Where the suspect
was searched did not matter, however, what was searched did.
131 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219:
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systematic change to the law or legal institutions in order to reproduce an existing
balance of values.”132 Roberts kept this in mind when the Court looked forward rather
than retrospectively when evaluating CSLI. To Roberts, “the rule the Court adopts
must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or
development.”133
The pervasiveness of smartphones and CSLI, how the information is
automatically created and not voluntarily disclosed, and the efficiencies CSLI offers
law enforcement persuaded Roberts to extend protections to citizens and their
information when these modern technologies are involved.134 This technology
fundamentally changed the way police can conduct investigations—a reason why
Fourth Amendment protection is necessary. Roberts stressed that “with just the click
of a button, the government can access each carriers' deep repository of information at
practically no expense.”135 For Roberts, it seemed there was simply no analogy that
would capture the pervasiveness and issues CSLI poses for privacy. CSLI is an
exceptional technology that requires more protection than other forms of information
under the Fourth Amendment.
B. Riley and Jones’ Pivotal Role in this Shift of Judicial Thinking
Moreover, Roberts arrived at his conclusion through Riley’s reasoning and the
Jones concurrences to justify his distinction for historical CSLI.136 He began with
Justice Sotomayor and Alito’s concurrences in Jones, recognizing an expectation of
privacy in the whole of one's movements.137 The concurrences signify that the
aggregation of enough locational data points, absent probable cause, impinges on

There is a world of difference between the limited types of personal information
addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information
casually collected by wireless carriers today. The Government thus is not asking for
a straightforward application of the third-party doctrine, but instead a significant
extension of it to a distinct category of information.
132 Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 357, 403 (2019) (quoting
Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 550–51 (2015)).
133 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
134 Id.:

Whoever the suspect turns out to be, he has effectively been tailed every moment
of every day for five years, and the police may . . . call upon the results of that
surveillance without regard to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Only the
few without cell phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.
135 Id. at 2219 (citing Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 12). The
majority additionally noted that the number of cell-sites has increased, therefore the sector covered
by each has shrunk. Given this, the precision of CSLI information is approaching GPS level precision.
Further, the majority noted that “wireless carriers already have the capability to pinpoint a phone’s
location within 50 meters.”
136 Riley, 573 U.S. at 393 (2014); Jones, 565 U.S. at 415.
137 Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
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individual privacy rights.138 To Roberts, CSLI records revealing some of peoples' most
private associations, crosses the line of permissibility.139 Given that smartphones are
so universal to societal participation, CSLI grants the State a comprehensive catalogue
of its citizens’ location and personal associations. This is precisely what Justices
Sotomayor and Alito alluded to in Jones.140
Roberts next relied upon Riley, where the Court refused to compare smartphone
records to other physical effects. Smartphones hold a breadth of information for users,
and the devices are practically a “feature of the human anatomy” that catalogue their
owner’s every movement.141 Building upon this notion, he framed the capabilities of
historical cell-site location tracking in virtually a dystopian manner. Each citizen can
be effortlessly tracked absent being a suspect to a crime merely because of the
smartphone in their pockets.142 The case of Riley was the first case to evaluate a
smartphone’s capabilities incident to one’s arrest.143 Roberts in Carpenter extended
this logic to the surveillance capabilities of smartphone data because of the sheer
amount of information it offers to law enforcement at a whim.144 CSLI is distinct from
other forms of surveillance technology and warrants a separate analysis because of its
investigative capabilities.
C. Flexibility Comes with a Price of Subjectivity, and No Definite Framework
The Court departed from its historical privacy jurisprudence in distinguishing
CSLI data from other third-party records. This is where the opinion receives much
criticism for its subjectivity. Roberts distinguished CSLI from other records to justify
not extending the third-party doctrine to a “distinct category of information.”145 This
distinction, according to Kennedy, will “inhibit law enforcement and keep defendants
and judges guessing for years to come.”146 To Kennedy, the case was simple: CSLI is a
third-party record and the doctrine is a categorical rule, rather than the balancing test
the majority sets forth.147 The decision cannot be reconciled with Smith and Miller.148
Notwithstanding Justice Kennedy’s concerns, the Carpenter decision makes the
evaluation more discretionary; and this subjectivity accounts for a technology's
omnipresence at the expense of a bright-line rule. Cases reconciling privacy issues with
disruptive technologies are not conducive to a bright-line rule because innovation
moves rapidly, and all cases possess varying issues and considerations. In the case of
Riley, Roberts noted that when the suit was filed, flip phones were used, while when
Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
140 Jones, 565 U.S. at 430; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 415.
141 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (citing Riley, 573 U.S. at 385) (“a cell phone – almost a ‘feature
of human anatomy,’- tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner. While individuals regularly
leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry cell phones with them all the time.”).
142 Id. (“Unlike with the GPS device in Jones, police need not even know in advance whether they
want to follow a particular individual, or when.”).
143 Riley, 573 U.S. at 393.
144 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
145 Id. at 2219.
146 Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 2226–27.
148 Id.
138
139
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the case was heard at the Supreme Court, they were obsolete.149 Roberts certainly, and
correctly, accounted for this speed in the approach he chose to adopt in Carpenter.
Moreover, Kennedy argued that traditional property principles govern the case.
The State searched nothing that Carpenter owned but instead information his wireless
carrier created and possessed, therefore implicating the third-party doctrine.150 But as
Justice Brandeis asserted in his Olmstead dissent, judges must protect citizens'
liberties from technological innovation.151 Justice Kennedy’s approach failed to account
for the applicability and flexibility property law principles lack towards contemporary
cases evaluating modern technologies, which Justice Gorsuch also noted in his
dissent.152 Kennedy’s approach would undermine one's privacy whenever a disruptive
invention is created and does not comport with modern technological realities.
The third-party doctrine has become antiquated with the expansion of digitalized
data and big data aggregation. It over-generalizes current data collection processes.153
This doctrine should be left in the pre-Carpenter era and not be applied to new
technologies. Technologies such as smartphones and CSLI cannot be adequately
analogized to anything preceding them.
The dissenting justices opined that Roberts failed to assert a workable framework
to extend this reasoning to other areas and technologies. Justices Kennedy and
Gorsuch also argued that the opinion is arbitrary and leaves a host of questions
unanswered.154 Justice Gorsuch characterized the majority's approach as an
“amorphous balancing test” that is too discretionary and based on a judge's policy
views.155 He added that the opinion fails to denote a duration for which it is permissible
for the government to collect CSLI.156 Both Justices focused on the apparent
arbitrariness of footnote 3, which states that more than seven days of data collection

149 Riley, 573 U.S. at 394. Roberts recognizes the difference between a traditional phone and a
smartphone which is essentially a miniature computer capable of storing mass amounts of data
tailored on its user.
150 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2230.
151 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting):

Moreover, ‘in the application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of
what has been, but of what may be’ . . . Ways may someday be developed by which
the government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them
in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Jordan M. Blanke, Carpenter v. United States Begs for Action, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE
260, 260 (2018). See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 573
(2009).
154 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2266–67 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting
in judgment).
155 Id. at 2267 (“But how are lower courts supposed to weigh these radically different interests?
Or assign values to different categories of information? All we know is that historical cell-site location
information (for seven days, anyway) escapes Smith and Miller's shorn grasp, while a lifetime of bank
or phone records does not.”).
156 Id.
152
153
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constitutes a search, yet fails to explain how the majority drew this line.157 To the
dissenters, Roberts came to the outcome he wanted on baseless reasoning.
D. Workable Carpenter Tests Created by Legal Scholars
As the dissenters appropriately argued, it is uncertain what the test promulgated
by Carpenter truly is. However, legal scholars have attempted to condense the case’s
principles into a workable framework to be used by the lower courts. In his book, Orin
Kerr reduces Carpenter to three elements: the information is collected via modern
technology; the information is not disclosed voluntarily; and the information must
reveal an intimate depiction of one’s life irrelevant to any investigation.158 The three
elements parallel much of what Roberts’ noted at the end of his majority opinion.159
Similarly, other scholars have also emphasized the factors the Chief Justice
believed critical to highlight for Carpenter to apply.160 While the frameworks theorized
by scholars vary slightly, one principle is central. Carpenter shifted the analysis from
an emphasis on collection and location to the nature and scope of the collected
information. This is what Carpenter (and Riley) should be read to symbolize: a
fundamental shift in the Court's opinion on how technology can dramatically affect
society. Depending on the technology, a more stringent analysis is sometimes required.
E. Applications to Comprehensive Facial Recognition Technologies
The pillars of the Carpenter decision concerning total surveillance can be
paralleled to other disruptive technologies like facial recognition.161 Facial Recognition
Technologies (FRT), when coupled with third-party databases and surveillance
technologies, which supply the state “with access to millions of images, will enable
large scale surveillance of the general populace.”162 Roberts believes the Fourth
Amendment seeks to secure “the privacies of life against arbitrary power” and “places

157 Id. at 2266 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“The Court does not tell us, for example, how far to carry
either principle or how to weigh them against the legitimate needs of law enforcement. At what point
does access to electronic data amount to ‘arbitrary’ authority? When does police surveillance become
‘too permeating’?”); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court's decision also
will have ramifications that extend beyond cell-site records to other kinds of information held by third
parties, yet the Court fails ‘to provide clear guidance to law enforcement’ and courts on key issues
raised by its reinterpretation of Miller and Smith.”).
158 ORIN KERR, THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT 3 (Oxford University Press, 2018).
159 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (Chief Justice Roberts highlighted the “deeply revealing nature”
of CSLI, its “depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of
its collection.” These were the qualities that distinguished CSLI from other categories of information).
160 Ohm, supra note 132, at 361. (citing Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223).
161 KERR, supra note 158, at 3. The Carpenter case’s logic applying Fourth Amendment
protections to data providing a historical personal record of one’s life irrelevant to any investigative
purpose, which is not voluntarily disclosed and continuously collected may be applicable to other
modern technologies that will be at issue in future cases. These principles are embodied in Orin
Kerr’s framework promulgated in his book and other publications, which will be used to evaluate
Carpenter’s applicability to facial recognition technologies.
162 H.R. Rep. No. 46-541, at 5 (2020).
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obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance.”163 According to this
reading of the Fourth Amendment, the parallels between CSLI and FRT systems
become apparent.
Although FRT systems share many similarities with CSLI, FRT can possess more
insidious tendencies with the records they produce. These records are not mere
“business records” as Justice Kennedy characterized CSLI, but a digital faceprint of
an individual.164 The concerns of FRT systems can be seen in China, where the
government uses them to track and contain ethnic minorities165—akin to what
protestors experienced in Hong Kong.166 While Roberts’ dystopian examples in
Carpenter about total surveillance may seem exaggerated, technologies permitting
governments to do this are taking hold around the world—even in the United States.167
There is a real possibility that there is much Fourth Amendment litigation on the
horizon with the emergence of FRT as such an omnipresent surveillance technology. It
is important to evaluate this technology in context of the principles that Carpenter
promulgates. The subsequent three sections will consist of an application of the threepart Kerr framework to FRT collected information. Despite there being no precise test
that can be discerned from Carpenter, Kerr’s framework is an effective vehicle for
applying Carpenter’s rationale to emerging technologies that potentially encroach upon
citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.
1. FRT Systems are Digital-Age Technologies
Under the first element of Kerr's framework, the information at issue must be
collected via modern technology “rather than traditional forms of surveillance.”168
Aligning with Roberts’ technological exceptionalism approach, this element omits
technologies pre-dating the digital age. FRT systems, regardless of form, would belong
in this category of technology, particularly when paired with police body cameras or
expansive third-party databases.
Roberts in Carpenter was conscious to distinguish between modern surveillance
methods and traditional measures like security cameras.169 However, privacy concerns
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at. 2215 (citing Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630; Di Re, 332 U.S. at 595).
Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
165 Hasan, supra note 77.
166 Id.
167 Id.:
163
164

Three California cities — San Francisco, Berkeley, and Oakland — as well as three
Massachusetts municipalities — Somerville, Northhampton, and Brookline —
banned the government’s use of face recognition from their communities. Following
another ACLU effort, the state of California blocked police body cam use of the
technology — forcing San Diego’s police department to shutter its massive face
surveillance flop. And in New York City, tenants successfully fended off their
landlord’s efforts to install face surveillance.
168 KERR, supra note 158, at 18 (“traditional forms of surveillance that predate the digital age are
categorically exempt.”).
169 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call
into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras. Nor do we
address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information.”).
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are heightened when police use FRT algorithms to automatically identify citizens and
track people in real-time.170 When Roberts drew this distinction, he likely did not
account for a pole camera equipped with an FRT system. If such technology were at
issue, it is less certain Roberts would categorize this technology as “traditional
surveillance.” This form of surveillance would be comprehensive enough to implicate
Carpenter's concerns.
2. Absence of Any Meaningful Choice by an Individual
The second element of Kerr's framework concerns information that is not
voluntarily divulged by the user.171 This, by far, was the most crucial consideration
Roberts accounted for in his decision not to extend the third-party doctrine to CSLI.172
This element's application depends largely on how the FRT system is implemented. If
police compare an image to a database of drivers' licenses and publicly posted photos—
Carpenter likely will not apply.173 Records of this nature would implicate the thirdparty doctrine and would not be automatically generated in the same sense as CSLI
records.174
On the other hand, when law enforcement compares images with a database like
the FBI’s FACE database, a nationwide repository comprised of law-abiding citizens,
new privacy issues arise.175 This is what the majority in Carpenter was primarily
concerned about: carriers collect this information regardless of whether you're a person
of interest.176 The same logic applies to comprehensive FRT systems. Though FRT
systems' records are more intrusive than CSLI records, issues of absolute surveillance
stemming from technological innovation remain present.
170 Jonathan Manes, Secrecy & Evasion in Police Surveillance Technology, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.
J. 503, 505 (2019).
171 KERR, supra note 158, at 20 (“This is plainly met when the government conducts the
surveillance or orders a third-party provider to do it . . . . The requirement is also met when the
government collects third-party records that are inescapably created through use of broadly-used
services.”).
172 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. CSLI generation requires no affirmative act on the part of the
user outside of merely powering the phone on.
173 H.R. Rep. No. 46-541, at 9 (2020) (“In short, current Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that
surveillance of activities arising in public typically does not raise Fourth Amendment concerns, but
surveillance that is prolonged and continuous may implicate privacy interests protected under the
Fourth Amendment.”); See Garvie, Bedoya & Frankle, supra note 75, at 132 (discussing Maryland’s
Image Repository System); see also Kevin Rector & Alison Knezevich, Maryland’s Use of Facial
Recognition Software Questioned by Researchers, Civil Liberties Advocates, BALT. SUN (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-facial-recognition-20161017-story.html.
174 Under these circumstances, users will have voluntarily disclosed this information to the
Bureau of Motor Vehicles, or the social media site in which they initially posted the photo. Here, an
affirmative act on the part of the user will ultimately cause the record to be created in the first place.
In a scenario such as this, it is likely that the third-party doctrine would apply in the same manner
in which it would apply in the cases of Smith and Miller.
175 Garvie, Bedoya & Frankle, supra note 75, at 20.
176 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. Chief Justice Roberts is chiefly concerned with the continuity
and comprehensiveness that logs such as a historical CSLI record achieve almost perfect surveillance
of an individual. This is universal throughout society and defies the logic in which the third-party
doctrine rests on. There are no limits in which wireless carriers abide by outside of their own company
policies.
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3. Information That is Deeply Revealing, Personal in Nature, and Irrelevant to Any
Investigation
The final element in Kerr’s framework evaluates whether information is
profoundly revealing, personal in nature, and irrelevant to any on-going
investigation.177 FRT that compares a single photo to a database of other images may
not reveal enough information about one's life to implicate Carpenter. However, if used
systematically, FRT systems are capable of enabling a government to “identify who
attends protests, political rallies, church, or AA meetings on an unprecedented
scale.”178 To capture enough of one's personal life, a FRT system must aggregate
location data from multiple points that creates a comprehensive record.179
Looking to the future as Roberts did in Carpenter, if major cities implement FRT
technologies on their camera networks, governments will be able to track citizens’
movements retroactively or in real-time.180 A scenario of this nature would
undoubtedly satisfy this element requiring a detailed chronicle of a person’s
whereabouts over a significant period.181 Given the ubiquitous technologies, like CSLI,
currently at law enforcement’s disposal, it truly is not difficult to imagine a
surveillance technology such as this.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court, as Justice Brandeis stated in Olmstead, has an obligation to protect
citizens’ liberties from the encroachments of technological innovation.182 Justice
Brandeis would have considered much of the technology at issue today in the courts to
be mere science fiction. This is why a flexible framework, as Brandeis opined, is
required. This idea was at the forefront of Roberts' mind as he chose to end his opinion
with Brandeis’ passage from Olmstead. Roberts focused on the over-arching principles

177

KERR, supra note 158, at 18:
The ‘privacies of life’ that Carpenter honors maintains the confidentiality of the
“private interests and concerns” central to our identities. They are truths about us,
such as our sexual preferences, our medical conditions, and our religious beliefs,
that in most cases the state has no legitimate interest in learning. These truths do
not reveal evidence of crime. They are just private facts about private people
leading quiet lives free from criminal conduct.

Hasan, supra note 77.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“With access to CSLI, the Government can now travel back in
time to retrace a person's whereabouts, subject only to the retention polices of the wireless carriers,
which currently maintain records for up to five years.”).
180 Garvie, Bedoya & Frankle, supra note 75, at 22.
181 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18. Chief Justice Roberts focused on the absolute surveillance
aspect of CSLI in distinguishing it from other third-party information that is created
contemporaneously, specifically, when the information creates a historical log of one’s location that
reveals not only one’s movements but associations. With the various networks of cameras throughout
modern cities in the United States, Europe, and Asia, such cameras equipped with FRT will be able
to capture the breadth of information CSLI does.
182 Id. at 2223 (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473–37).
178
179
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that the Fourth Amendment stands for rather than mechanically applying its text.183
Carpenter should be read to symbolize this notion.
Roberts indeed made the inquiry more subjective; however, this discretion is well
placed on the principles of technological exceptionalism that can also be seen in the
Court's cases like Riley, Jones, and Kyllo.184 CSLI and technology of such a pervasive
nature cannot be compared to other traditional analogs. As technology becomes even
more of a cornerstone to society, the concerns of absolute surveillance that yields a
historical record contemporaneously absent any meaningful choice are evermore
present.185
Comprehensive FRT implicates precisely these concerns if they are used in the
manner authoritarian regimes around the world currently do.186 When evaluating a
single photo in comparison to a database, these concerns are not present. Though,
when a network of cameras is used to track demonstrators like in Hong Kong, China,
or Turkey, Carpenter should apply to such surveillance.
The subjectivity that stems from the Carpenter framework will come at the price
of uniformity or a general rule resembling the third-party doctrine. However, this
likely will make Carpenter’s reasoning applicable to more pervasive technologies in the
future, so long as concerns of total surveillance are present. Technologies are so unique
and distinct that a bright-line rule which would suffice for traditional matters, is not
workable in a realm that changes so frequently. Roberts, in choosing to adopt a flexible
framework, accounted for this.187
It is difficult to discern where the case will ultimately nestle into the Court's
privacy jurisprudence. Carpenter, which represents a stark departure from the
categorical third-party doctrine, could be left to the side by courts on the grounds of
the narrowness of the decision.188 If CSLI is not at issue, then Carpenter may not be
183 Id. at 2214 (To Roberts, the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution seeks to “‘secure the
privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power’ and to him what was central to the framers was to “place
obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance”) (internal citation omitted)).
184 Id. (“As technology has enhanced the Government's capacity to encroach...this Court has
sought to “assure preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted . . . . Likewise, in Riley, the Court recognized the “immense storage
capacity” of modern cell phones in holding that police officers must generally obtain a warrant before
searching the contents of a phone.”).
185 Id. at 2223. Roberts singled out the “deeply revealing nature” of CSLI as well as its “depth,
breadth, and inescapable automatic nature of its collection.” As modern technologies become ever
more complex, more processes will be left to automation. In the future, as it is now, the only affirmative
act one could undertake would be creating a user profile or downloading the application. Is this the
proper place to draw the line for voluntary disclosure concerning digital age technologies, despite no
true act leading to such disclosure?
186 Hasan, supra note 77.
187 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“At any rate, the rule the Court adopts ‘must take into account
of more sophisticated systems that are already in use of in development”) (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at
36).
188 Id. at 2220. In Carpenter, the Chief Justice noted that the decision was narrow, and it did not
opine on matters outside of historical CSLI aggregation. He stated that real-time CSLI collection nor
“tower dumps” were covered by this opinion. Additionally, he stated that both Smith and Miller
remain undisturbed, though it appears that the third-party doctrine’s applicability has been stripped
somewhat. See also U.S. v. Diggs, 385 F. Supp. 3d 648, 655 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“the government’s
warrantless search of historical GPS data revealing Diggs’s movements over the court of more than a
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relevant for lower courts. Although, courts could take the decision for what it signifies:
that an extension of principles used for analog technologies to the modern technologies
of today fails to protect the liberties guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
Comparable to Justice Harlan in the case of Katz, Roberts understood that the
analysis needed to change to abate the encroachment of citizens’ liberties by new
innovations.189 Traditional analogies, much like the property principles Justice
Gorsuch asserted, can only take us so far when modern technologies are at issue.190
The assumptions relied on there are not present with innovations that dramatically
alter the way the world works. Carpenter arrived at the correct outcome; however, it is
impossible to state whether the case will be a step forward. That being said, the case
should not be overruled. Carpenter represents the first step in constructing new
assumptions to evaluate new disruptive technologies in the future.

month was a search”); U.S. v. Tuggle, 2018 WL 3631881, at *3 (C.D. Ill. 2018) (“The cameras only
captured what would have been visible to any passerby in the neighborhood . . . while the Supreme
Court has recently extended Fourth Amendment protections to address surveillance methods
implicating new technologies, the surveillance here used ordinary video cameras that have been
around for decades.”).
189 Katz, 380 U.S. at 360–61.
190 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at. 2268.

